Deck

Cable One · CABO · NYSE

Cable One is a small U.S. cable broadband operator (Sparklight brand) serving roughly 2.9 million households across 24 mostly rural and small-town states, earning recurring monthly subscription revenue almost entirely from residential internet.

$48.77
Price
$275M
Market cap
$1.50B
Revenue FY2025
999K
Broadband subscribers
Spun off from Graham Holdings in 2015 near $400; ran to a 2020 peak of $2,300; printed a fresh 52-week low at $48.77 this week — roughly a 98% drawdown from the peak.
2 · The setup

A $275M equity sits on $3.0B of debt and a cash engine that still throws off $517M after capex.

  • 0.53× cash earnings. At $48.77 the equity is priced at 0.53× FY2025 Adjusted EBITDA-less-capex of $517M; healthy cable peers trade at 5–8×. Sell-side consensus 12-month price target is $101.
  • Cash grew through the revenue decline. Revenue is down 12% from the FY2022 peak, but Adjusted EBITDA-less-capex moved from $478M (FY22) to $517M (FY25) as the DOCSIS upgrade wave passed. FCF margin has held in an 18–23% band for nine straight years through COVID, the Hargray rollup, and the live overbuild cycle.
  • Leverage is the leash. Net debt $3.04B against $153M cash; current ratio collapsed from 1.31 to 0.40 as $594M of debt stepped into the current window — chiefly the $575M 0% 2026 convertible notes (refinanced under the revolver in March 2026), plus ~$17M of term-loan amortization. Normalized leverage 3.79× today, covenant cap 5.0× — and Altice at 5.5× is the live distressed template.
Cigar-butt setup with a real asset and real leverage — cheap on cash flow, expensive on resilience.
3 · The one number

The whole debate now turns on residential data ARPU — one print, due ~July 30.

  • Why it matters. Less than 60% of CABO's 2.9M-passing footprint has been overbuilt at 100 Mbps+; the protected ~40% is the entire margin advantage versus peers. ARPU near $81 is the live evidence the back book has not been forced into retention discounts to defend share.
  • Where it sits. $80.84 across FY2025; $80.71 in Q4 FY25; $79.51 in Q1 FY26 — a 1.5% sequential softening that the market read as the back-book break. Management's transcript attribution puts the move in front-book acquisition promotions, not a back-book reset.
  • What decides it. Q2 FY2026 earnings, roughly 74 days away. A hold at or above $79.51 with subscriber losses inside −8,000 PSUs validates the cash engine; a sequential drop below $78.70 would confirm retention discounting has reached the back book and collapse the moat thesis.
4 · Money picture

Best-in-cable margins, worst-in-cable equity tranche.

53.4%
Adj EBITDA margin top of peer set
$517M
Adj EBITDA − capex up from $478M FY22
3.8×
Net debt / EBITDA covenant cap 5.0×
$586M
FY25 impairment Q2 franchise + goodwill

Reported FY2025 was a $356M GAAP loss, dominated by a $586M franchise and goodwill writedown the auditors recognized as the Hargray-era deals being overpaid. Strip the impairment and the underlying Adjusted EBITDA margin still prints at 53% — higher than Charter (39.5%), Comcast (29.8%), or Altice (38.0%) — because the rural footprint avoided the cost-loaded urban model and management has actively shrunk video. The equity is priced for that margin to compress toward the Altice 38% over five years.

5 · The earnings-quality gap

The same Adjusted EBITDA number anchors the bonus, the PSU vesting, and the bank covenant.

  • $670M bridge. GAAP EBITDA was $131M in FY2025 against Adjusted EBITDA of $801.7M — a $670M reconciliation that includes the $586M impairment, $138M of recurring equity-method losses on minority fiber stakes, $43M of stock-based comp, and a growing $19M "system conversion" line.
  • The rollup consumed every dollar. Nine-year cumulative free cash flow after acquisitions is negative $1.58B; the 2017–2021 rollup (NewWave, Fidelity, Hargray, CableAmerica) consumed every dollar of operating cash. The FY2022 $358M buyback at $1,000+ per share destroyed roughly $340M at the buyback alone.
  • Same metric, three jobs. Adjusted EBITDA simultaneously sets executive bonus, long-term equity vesting, and the 5.0× leverage covenant. Underwrite from Adj EBITDA minus equity-method losses minus stock-based comp at normalized capex — not the headline.
Directionally honest, presentationally generous — the risk is the gap between the bonus metric and the cash that reaches common shareholders.
6 · The pivot

From rural compounder to defend-and-deleverage — the story management has to tell now is narrower than the one Cable One built its identity on.

Before: Through 2021 Cable One was "the natural aggregator of rural broadband." Five acquisitions in five years (NewWave 2017, Clearwave/Fidelity 2019, Hargray 2021, CableAmerica 2021) levered the balance sheet to 4×, pushed ARPU, and retired shares. The stock ran from a 2015 spin-off price near $400 to $2,300 by late 2020.

Pivot: Fiber overbuilders and 5G fixed-wireless reached CABO's tertiary markets around 2022; revenue rolled over in FY2023. The May 2025 dividend suspension and 41.8% one-day crash, the Q2 2025 $586M impairment, the February 2026 hire of outsider CEO Jim Holanda — formerly 14 years running Astound Broadband, the exact class of private overbuilder pressuring the footprint — and the January 2026 forced exercise of the MBI put together ended the rollup era.

Today: Capital allocation is mechanical — $403M of debt paid down in FY25, the quarterly dividend fully suspended in Q2 2025 (~$67M/yr freed), a tower-fiber contract sold for $42M and used to retire $90.6M of debt at a discount, the MBI buyout closing October 1, 2026. The 5-to-10-year case is defend-and-deleverage, not compound. Holanda arrived with zero CABO shares against a 5-year, $8.4M ownership guideline; insider ownership across officers and directors is 0.9%.

The board hired the disrupter rather than the defender.
7 · Bull & Bear

Lean Watchlist — the case is genuinely 50/50 and the deciding ARPU print lands in 74 days.

  • For. At 0.53× cash earnings the implied terminal decline rate is inconsistent with the actual trajectory; stabilization would compress the cash-earnings discount toward peer multiples. Consensus price target is $101.
  • For. ARPU held at $80.84 through FY25 despite five quarters of accelerating subscriber losses — management is voluntarily shedding the lowest-margin subs rather than discount. The protected ~40% of footprint has not yet broken.
  • Against. Less than 60% of footprint is overbuilt today and BEAD's $42.5B is funding the rest into CABO's core states (AZ, ID, MS, MO, OK, SC, TX). Residential data subscribers fell −55,300 in FY25 and another −12,600 in Q1 FY26.
  • Against. $1.71B variable-rate term loan, $594M current portion, 0.40 current ratio. A 15–20% Adjusted EBITDA decline takes leverage through 4.5× toward the covenant; Altice at 5.5× is the live distressed template and trades at $378M of market cap against $30B of EV.
My view — cheap if the back book holds, distressed if it does not. The deciding Q2 FY26 ARPU print is ~74 days away and there is no edge in front-running it.

Watchlist to re-rate: Q2 FY26 residential data ARPU vs the $79.51 Q1 floor (~July 30); pro-forma leverage at the MBI close (October 1, 2026 — management projects "slightly over 4×"); any pre-emptive refinancing of the $1.71B term loan ahead of the 2027 maturity wall.